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Abstract: This paper will describe the evolution of the civilian administration in East Ghouta in order to 
explain the development of the resilience mechanisms which have allowed this Damascus suburb and rebel 
stronghold to withstand chemical attacks in August 2013, a 23-month long siege, repeated aerial bombings 
and ground invasions by the Syrian regime as well as, most recently, the advance of the Islamic State (IS) in 
those territories. A detailed discussion of the various administrative bodies, created and run by civilian actors 
and responsible for the provision of the basic services for a population of 2 million people, will reveal the 
emergence of a governance model centred on the role of the city council and its constituent medical, relief, 
services and information offices. This civilian administration model, similar to the one implemented in the 
“liberated” areas in the Aleppo and Idlib governorates, is considered by many civilians and members of the 
opposition as an embodiment of the original principles of the Syrian revolution because of its commitment to 
moderate Islamic values and a transparent electoral process, as demonstrated by the January 2014 electrons 
in East Ghouta. As such, it offers an alternative to the governance models of Bashar al-Assad and the Islamic 
State, implemented in other parts of Syria. However, even though the civilian administration in East Ghouta 
has repeatedly illustrated its resilience to external attacks and adaptability vis-à-vis the deteriorating 
humanitarian situation, the obstacles to its survival have multiplied. In addition to the violent attempts of the 
regime and IS to take over this territory, the encroachment of armed groups on the activities of the civilian 
actors, the exhaustion of medical and food supplies, and the difficulty in standardising the governance 
structures on the local and provincial level have proved to be some of the overwhelming challenges to the 
governance model in East Ghouta that, until today, continue to question the endurance of the “liberated” 
territories around Damascus.
*
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Ghoutas form an agricultural belt around the Syrian capital, Damascus, that plays the role of 
its extended suburbs and include about sixty cities and a total of two million people. They have a 
long history of resistance as the stronghold of the Syrian nationalists fighting the French mandate 
in the country since the 1930s. In modern time, the Ghoutas have been an important agricultural 
region, which however underwent economic difficulties in 2010 as much of the land in the region 
was sequestered by the Assad regime, exacerbating tensions between the residents and the 
central government.1  
 
The Ghoutas entered the revolution on 25 March 2011 when the first big protest took place in 
Douma, which was followed by demonstrations in the eastern part of the suburbs, notably in 
Harasta, Zamalka, Jobar, Arbin, Ain Terma and Kafr Batna.2 What started out as a peaceful protest 
fuelled by demands for greater political freedom and agricultural subsidies to the suburbs 
developed into a militarised conflict as soon as the regime’s violent crackdown reached Zamalka 
and Douma in April 2011. After the militarisation of the conflict and the advances of the rebels in 
the region around Damascus, the east and north parts of Ghouta were established in November 
2011 as the main rebel strongholds in the Damascus province, with less concentrated but still 
present rebel forces in the south and west Ghouta. Incessant rebel offensives into Damascus in 
July 2012, February 2013 and July 2013 were carried out by opposition armed groups based in East 
Ghouta.3 During the last of those offensives, rebel forces penetrated the capital, reaching as far as 
its east neighbourhood, Jobar, fired mortars at the Presidential Palace, hit Bashar al-Assad’s 
convoy, and seized important roads which served as the regime’s essential supply routes.4  
                                                  
*
 The author would like to thank her thesis supervisor, Prof. Jean-Pierre Filiu (Sciences Po) for his guidance and advice. 
1
 Laith al-Khatib, ‘Syria’s Eastern Ghouta: A Chaotic Conflict of Brigades’, Al Akhbar, 20 December 2013, http://english.al-
akhbar.com/node/17975. 
2
 ‘Statistical Report of the Center for East Ghouta’ [‘ ريرقتلا ا اصحلإيئ مل زكر ةطوغلا ةيقرشلا قئاقحو ةلهذم ’], All4Syria, 6 November 
2013, http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/109571. 
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 Isabelle Lasserre, ‘Syria: Anti-Assad Operation Began’ [‘Syrie: l’opération anti-Assad a commence’], Le Figaro, August 
22, 2013, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2013/08/22/01003-20130822ARTFIG00438-syrie-l-operation-anti-assad-
a-commence.php. 
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 Valerie Szybala, ‘Assad Strikes Damascus’, Institute for the Study of War, March 2014. 
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The concentration of the armed opposition in East Ghouta and the liberation of other towns in the 
north and south regions of the Ghoutas was also seen as an unprecedented threat to the capital, 
which to a large extent motivated the indiscriminate and brutal tactics that the regime has used 
vis-à-vis the rebel-held territories in East Ghouta. Additionally, while it has repeatedly intensified 
its military campaign to retake those territories by resorting to air strikes, ground invasions, barrel 
bombs, local Shia militias, a total siege around those territories and finally a chemical attack, the 
regime has nevertheless failed to re-take East Ghouta until today. While the regime finally forced 
some rebel-held towns to yield and sign a truce with it in the west and north part of the Ghoutas, 
notably with Moaddamia in December 2013 and Barzeh in January 2014,5 it has not yet been 
successful in weakening the resolve of the opposition in East Ghouta even if its tactics have had a 
catastrophic impact on the population in this area, leading to the deaths of more than 28 000 
people.6 
 
While the importance of the military component of the persistence and resilience of the rebels in 
East Ghouta is undeniable and has been the focus of different studies examining the evolution of 
the armed struggle in the Damascus Province,7 the activities of the civilian opposition in those 
liberated territories necessitate a similar kind of analysis. Based on interviews with local activists, 
official statements used by governance bodies in East Ghouta and the information extracted from 
their websites and social media pages, this study outlines the structure of governance in East 
Ghouta. In doing so, it also underlines the specific humanitarian challenges and military 
circumstances which have shaped and transformed them between August 2013 and January 2014. 
The similar foundations, both ideological and structural, of those bodies demonstrate the gradual 
emergence of a model of governance centred around the role of the local city council in East 
Ghouta. However, the variations in the organisation of those councils in each city and the creation 
of unique offices and civil initiatives also demonstrate the more unfamiliar features of this model 
of governance as well as the obstacles to its standardisation and unification. The last part of this 
study examines the most recent attempts of the civilian administration in East Ghouta to address 
this issue, namely creation of unified offices responsible for the provision of administrative and 
other services on the provincial level and the establishment of the first provincial council of East 
Ghouta situated in Douma.  
 
2. The evolution of governance in East Ghouta  
 
Due to its status as rebel-held, or “liberated”, territory ever since late 2012, East Ghouta has 
experienced the complete withdrawal of state services and cessation of the activities of the state 
institutions. As a result, the provision of basic services such as food, water, electricity, and internet 
has been denied to the civilians in those territories, in addition to the collapse of the logistical 
networks provided previously by those institutions. Furthermore, the discrediting of the state 
apparatus following the violent repression of the revolution and ensuing civil war curtailed the 
number of available governance models available to a population that had been subjected to a the 
authoritarian governance of the Ba’ath party since 1966.  This necessitated the elaboration of a 
novel and different model of governance for the “liberated” territories.  
 
                                                  
5
 Ruth Sherlock, ‘Starving Syrians told: “Give up the rebels, and you will have food”’, The Telegraph, 01 February 2014, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10611738/Starving-Syrians-told-Give-up-the-rebels-
and-you-will-have-food.html. 
6
 Violations Documentation Center (VDC), http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/.  
7
 Valerie Szybala, ‘Assad Strikes Damascus’, Institute for the Study of War, March 2014; Joseph Halliday, ‘The Struggle for 
Syria in 2011’, Institute for the Study of War, December 2011; Elizabeth O’Bagy, ‘The opposition advances in Damascus’, 
Institute for the Study of War, 9 August 2013.  
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According to the testimony of local actors, various governance initiatives have taken place in East 
Ghouta ever since the concentration of the opposition in this area. In order of increasing 
organisational complexity and functionality, examples of such initiatives are the civil defence 
teams, coordination committees, and city councils, all of which have been shaped according to the 
particular needs of each city. This has been a process complicated not only by the continual 
military contestation of the rebel-held cities in East Ghouta by the Assad regime,8 but also by the 
lack of formal cadres and professionals in the field of administration left to work in this area. As 
already mentioned, another obstacle has been the lack of a governance model whose resilience 
has been tested and whose nature has been proven to be compatible with the original principles 
of the revolution such as democracy, freedom and inclusiveness.  
 
As a result, the different governance bodies in East Ghouta have tended to build upon and replace 
each other, undergoing transformations meant to address their weaknesses and meet more 
efficiently the evolving needs of the local populations. The highly improvised, changing and often 
unstable nature of those bodies, the most prominent and widespread of which have been the local 
city councils, has resulted from the difficult conditions of their creation, but has also been the 
origin of their flexibility, decentralisation, and resilience to different types of attacks. This ability to 
function continually according to the logic of crisis management and face repeatedly medical, 
humanitarian and military emergencies has prompted the gradual evolution of the city councils 
into permanent and irreplaceable governance structures in the rebel-held territories. They have 
steadily taken on the role as providers of most basic administrative and other services in the area 
and have established networks of cooperation and communication between each other. Those 
networks have demonstrated their relevance particularly in crisis situations, such as the chemical 
attacks of 21 August 2013.  While this attack was devastating for the population in East Ghouta, 
killing more than 1,400 people, it nevertheless acted as a trigger for the re-activation of 
institution-building in the area and the strengthening of the links between and within the city 
councils.9  
 
3. The local city council as the main unit of governance in East Ghouta  
 
The internal structure of the city council—the main governance mechanism in East Ghouta—offers 
insight into the priorities, practices and dynamics of the civilian opposition in that area, exhibiting 
a high degree of creativity and adaptability. It also highlights the main problems and obstacles, on 
the humanitarian and administrative levels, that the civilian opposition faces on a day-to-day basis 
and the governance mechanisms that have gradually developed to address those issues.   
 
The local city councils, especially those that were set up in the aftermath of the chemical attacks, 
built upon the local coordination committees which had been established at the start of the 
revolution to organise the demonstrations but did not replace them in all towns. While those 
coordination committees were at the outset of the revolution mostly a type of information offices, 
tasked with the dissemination of information and the organisation of activities in the town, the 
militarisation of the conflict and the multiplication of problems affecting the population as a part 
of the armed conflict necessitated an expansion of the activities of those bodies to include the 
provision of other services too.  
 
                                                  
8
 Leana Hosea, ‘Growing suffering of Syria’s besieged civilians’, BBC, 5 December 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-middle-east-25240296; Michael Weiss, ‘Assad’s Terror-Famine’, NOW, 18 October 2013, https://now.mmedia.me 
/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/assads-terror-famine.  
9
 ‘‘Insight: after chemical horror, besieged Syrian suburb defiant’, Reuters, 4 October 2013, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/10/04/us-syria-crisis-zamalka-insight-idUSBRE9930E420131004. 
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All local councils in East Ghouta thus have at root an information office which is responsible for 
the constant circulation of information, the contact with foreign and local media, with other city 
councils and figures from the opposition, and the documentation of all events in the city. The 
importance of those information offices was clearly demonstrated during the 21 August 2013 
chemical attacks. The pre-existing networks between the information offices and coordination 
committees in the towns in East Ghouta allowed for a very swift information exchange at the time 
of the attacks. The information offices at the sites of the attack—Zamalka and Ain Tarma—
reported the attacks around 15 minutes after the sarin-filled rockets hit those towns. Only ten 
minutes after that, at 02:35 am, the information office at Kafr Batna—another town situated 
several kilometres to the east from the impact sites—reported the strike, putting all of East 
Ghouta on alarm in a remarkably short period of time.10  
 
This fast information exchange, aided by the activation of the pre-existing networks between 
those information offices, in turn allowed for the almost immediate sending of first responders to 
the site of the strikes. Those first responders, many of whom were media officers themselves, 
helped with the evacuation of residents and the transportation of wounded civilians to safer areas, 
but for the most part also died as a result of the exposure to sarin.11 All but one of the Zamalka 
information office members were killed on 21 August by the chemical gases and the subsequent 
air strikes, which targeted some of the hospitals to which the wounded had been taken.12 In 
addition, it was the media officers of the affected towns in East Ghouta that recorded the 
internationally disseminated videos and photos which corroborated the news of the chemical 
attacks and which were later used as evidence by foreign intelligence services and by the UN to 
determine the use of sarin.13 In the aftermath of the attacks, the information offices within the city 
councils became a particularly important outlet, which allowed for those towns, isolated due to 
the siege imposed by the regime around East Ghouta, to communicate with the rest of the world 
and raise awareness about their deteriorating humanitarian situation.  
 
The city councils in East Ghouta also consist of medical offices, which control and organise the 
medical points in this area. The destruction of numerous hospitals and medical points by air strikes 
as well as the inadequacy of medical resources following the siege around East Ghouta have 
necessitated the creation of hospitals or medical points in private homes, mostly underground, 
with very limited access to electricity, water, light and even air due to safety concerns. A report, 
produced by certain medical offices and the human rights organisation Violations Documentation 
Center (VDC) based in Douma in East Ghouta, has outlined the deterioration of the medical 
situation in the region, enumerated the hospitals destroyed by regime raids, identified the 
kidnapped or killed medical personnel and specified the most needed medical equipment.14 
Another problem that the medical offices face on a daily basis is the lack of medical staff in the 
rebel-held territories: for example, the Al-Ghouta Islamic Hospital receives about 1,200-1,600 
injured people per month, but has a staff of only 5 doctors. In the entire East Ghouta region, there 
is one doctor per 80, 000 people or a total of 100 doctors for a population of 2 million.15 The 
                                                  
10
 Kafr Batna Coordination Committee, 21 August 2013, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=504412646299952 
&set=a.170097259731494.40969.169014683173085. 
11
 Oren Dorell, ‘Reports: Syria chemical attack responders die’, USA Today, 23 August 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/world/2013/08/22/syria-chemical-attack-responders-die/2686971/. 
12
 Special report on the use of chemical weapons in Damascus Suburbs’, Violations Documentation Center in Syria, 22 
August 2013, https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports//chemicaldamascussuburbs#.UzM4edznfxc. 
13
 Saqba Coordination Committee, 21 August 2013, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=648554415168522 
&set=a.228986480458653.65498.225790024111632&type=1; Hamourieh Coordination Committee, 21 August 2013, 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=471209819641911&set=a.261831450579750.58706.252158191547076.  
14
 ‘A Special report on the medical situation in East Ghouta - Damascus suburbs’, Violations Documentation Center in 
Syria, November 2013, http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports/1383565710#.Uzg5-a1dV5A. 
15
 Ibid.  
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pharmacies in East Ghouta are also facing shortages: medications such as painkillers, antibiotics 
and asthma inhalers have almost been exhausted, which in turn has forced doctors to only 
administer very small doses of painkillers to their patients. On a day-to-day basis, the medical 
offices, therefore, are responsible for the maximisation of the already insufficient resources and 
the maintaining of the limited number of medical facilities that, without proper management and 
support, would be incapacitated by the obstacles they face.  
 
The 21 August 2013 chemical attacks demonstrated the role of the medical offices not only on a 
daily basis, but also at the time of emergency and humanitarian crisis. Their existence within each 
city council facilitated the communication and cooperation between the numerous medical points 
in East Ghouta at that time of extreme chaos and confusion.16 As a result, the medical office in 
Jobar was able to organise the redistribution of atropine, (essential for the treatment of exposure 
to sarin), to the medical points in Zamalka and Ain Tarma that needed it most.17 In the aftermath 
of the attacks, the medical offices within each city analysed and identified the mistakes made, 
such as the transportation of residents exposed to sarin directly to the hospital from the site of 
attacks, which had led to the further contamination of other patients and doctors. They were thus 
able to create emergency plans and training procedures in preparation for possible further attacks 
as well as to implement programmes for the standardisation of the use of medical equipment, 
thereby limiting the waste of resources at a time of crisis.  
 
Relief offices are also present in the city councils established throughout East Ghouta. They have 
been created to address the lack of resources, including food and water, that has resulted from 
the siege imposed on East Ghouta. The “Starvation Until Submission Campaign” implemented by 
the Assad regime since November 2012 has consisted of the limiting of the entry and exit of the 
area and then, in October 2013, in its total sealing off from the neighbouring regions.18 The results 
of the siege have affected every domain of private and social life and have necessitated the 
establishment of relief offices to address the multiplying problems connected to the exhaustion of 
resources in the towns. One of those problems—the soaring prices of essential goods such as rice, 
water, milk and wheat—has acutely affected East Ghouta, causing conflicts between civilians over 
the selling or withholding of resources. Another, more serious problem – the sheer unavailability 
of other goods, has gradually become the main responsibility of those relief offices.19 They are 
responsible for the communication with external donors, such as Syrian expats, international relief 
groups and others regarding the delivery of basic goods, their redistribution to the most 
vulnerable residents and its storage in warehouses for future emergencies. In addition, they often 
participate in the organisation of the difficult transportation of those goods to their respective 
towns and put themselves in danger when having to approach the regime checkpoints maintaining 
the siege around East Ghouta.  
 
The relief offices within the local city councils often execute their activities in cooperation with the 
services offices, created to address the deterioration of the living conditions in the Ghoutas on the 
infrastructural level. Due to the intense shelling, ground attacks, barrel bombs and the chemical 
attacks of 21 August 2013, many buildings, including hospitals, schools and mosques, have been 
                                                  
16
 Rima Marrouch, ’Syrian Doctors: Desperate Patients Flooded in at 3 am’, NPR, 22 August 2013, http://www.npr.org/ 
blogs/parallels/2013/08/22/214544301/syrian-doctors-desperate-patients-flooded-in-at-3-a-m. 
17
 ‘A Statement from Jobar Medical Point regarding the chemical attacks’, 21 August 2013, https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=RoCT81NcDnc. 
18
 Souad Khibiyeh, ‘Green bread from animal feed is Syrians’ food in besieged areas’, The Syrian Observer, 16 January 
2014, http://78.138.104.166/Features/Features/Green+bread+from+animal+feed+is+Syrians+food+in+besieged+areas; 
‘Insight: Starvation in Syria: A war tactic’, Reuters, 30 October 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/30/us-
syria-crisis-hunger-insight-idUSBRE99T07I20131030. 
19
 Facebook page of the Northern/Douma sector of the Unified Aid Bureau in East Ghouta: https://www.facebook.com/ 
Office.relief.douma. 
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destroyed along with many water tanks, power grids, electricity posts, and roads. The services 
offices have been created with the purpose of fixing or rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure.20 
Their work on the fixing of water systems, pipes, the cleansing of water sources and the digging of 
new wells has been particularly important in view of the lack of water in the besieged, rebel-held 
territories. Many of the relief offices within the city councils were created as ad-hoc civil defence 
teams in the aftermath of the 21 August 2013 chemical attacks when streets and buildings had to 
be cleaned from the debris and the residents had to be instructed on how to clean their own 
houses from the chemical residue.21 Those improvised teams later evolved into the relief offices 
that had to face not only the aftermath of the chemical attacks, but also the new infrastructural 
and humanitarian predicaments exacerbated by the tightening of the siege around East Ghouta 
and the intensification of air strikes. 
 
Another important office in most city councils is the human rights office that documents the 
human rights violations, the number of wounded or killed civilians, the names and numbers of 
prisoners, disappeared, people in need of special care and the number of refugees from other 
cities. The importance of those organisations has become significantly more pronounced in the 
aftermath of the attacks and particularly after the visit of the UN chemical inspectors to East 
Ghouta on 28 and 29 August 2013.22 Human rights offices as well as human rights organisations 
active throughout all of East Ghouta, such as the Violations Documentation Center (VDC) based in 
Douma, collected blood, tissue, and earth samples, as well as parts of the rockets which carried 
sarin in an effort which was later praised by the UN inspectors for its usefulness in the 
investigation of the attacks.23 The importance of those human rights offices is also related to the 
belief among the civilian opposition in the possibility of justice and the utility of their work in the 
event of the setting up of a criminal tribunal to investigate the human rights abuses during the 
Syrian war. The establishment of such offices demonstrates that, in addition to providing for the 
physical needs for basic services through the medical, relief and services offices, the population in 
East Ghouta is also committed to its need for justice and accountability and is ready to work for 
those principles in its institutional framework.  
 
Even if many of the city councils are organised in a similar fashion and consist of information, 
medical, relief, services, and human rights offices, this organisational structure is certainly far from 
being the standard for all councils. The adaptability and responsiveness to the demands of the 
population have so far overridden the need to standardise the councils’ structure throughout the 
region. As a result, unique offices have appeared in each city council, highlighting some of the 
additional needs of the residents in that respective town and their ability to offer institutional 
solutions to their problems. For example, the Office of Revolutionary Action in Arbin is responsible 
for the organisation of demonstrations and other political activities, demonstrating the desire of 
the residents in the town to continue the practice of peaceful protesting that for them embodies 
the original principles of the revolution.24 The Committee for Women and Children of Arbin was 
also created to train women and children in first aid, preliminary paramedic procedures, nursing, 
                                                  
20
 ‘The Relief Office in East Ghouta’, Kafr Batna Gate, http://kafarbatnagate.com/?p=83. Youtube video of the activities 
of the Relief Office: http://youtu.be/PD5BxxR2P-M. 
21
 ‘Residents of Eastern Ghouta fear another chemical attacks’, The Damascus Bureau, 21 October 2013, 
http://www.damascusbureau.org/?p=5987. 
22
 Ian Sample, ‘UN Inspectors in Syria: under fire, in record time, sarin is confirmed’, The Guardian, 16 September 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/16/un-inspectors-syria-sarin-gas. 
23
 Zack Baddorf, ‘Exclusive: Damascus Doctor has Tissue Samples From Chemical Weapons Attack, Waiting on UN to 
Inspect”,TRNS, 25 August 2013, http://www.talkradionews.com/world-news/2013/08/25/damascus-doctor-has-tissue-
samples-from-chemical-weapons-attack-waiting-on-un-to-inspect.html.  
24
 Razan Zaitouneh, ‘Local Council in Erbeen: A fighter’s place is not among civilians’, The Damascus Bureau, 17 June 
2013, http://www.damascusbureau.org/?p=5391. 
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the use of ambulances, drugs as well as sawing, knitting, cooking and reading.25 Another unique 
office, “the siege and external relations office” of the Saqba city council, was created specifically 
with the purpose of coordinating the delivery of aid to the town and overcoming the problems 
posed by the siege around East Ghouta.26 The institutional creativity of the civilian opposition in 
East Ghouta has accompanied its commitment to building a relatively unified model of governance 
through the role of the city council and has enhanced the resilience of the rebel-held territories to 
the multiple regime assaults.  
 
4. The consolidation of the civilian administration in East Ghouta 
 
The multiplication of local city councils around East Ghouta has contributed to strengthening the 
population’s responsiveness to the continuing regime attacks and the hardship of living under a 
siege, but has also posed logistical problems and complicated the relations with external donors 
and the cooperation between the city councils themselves. Therefore, the creation of a larger 
body—a unified Council for all of East Ghouta—had been high on the priority list of the civilian 
opposition, especially ever since the chemical attacks which prompted an expansion and more 
central role of the local city councils. A broad and inclusive civilian movement, called the National 
Assembly of the Forces of the Revolution in East Ghouta, was established on January 27, 2013 to 
gather all actors in the region interesting in the formation of a unified council.27 It includes the 
members of numerous local political parties, civilians and rebels from 58 towns in the area and 
strives to be a “truly representative model for a united local council for the Eastern Ghouta to 
serve as an elected government and manage the affairs and public services of the region.”28  
 
The movement has officially expressed its dedication to the establishment of a free, pluralistic and 
civil state, the rule of law, justice, equality and respect for human rights, and “Islam as the primary 
carrier of culture and history” in East Ghouta. It has also stated that it wishes to set an example of 
“administrative decentralisation” for the future government of Syria and has thus assisted many 
cities in East Ghouta in setting up their own local councils.29 The National Assembly’s Board of 
Directors has also regularly visited already established local city councils in the East Ghouta in 
order to assess their capabilities and needs and to compile all information needed for the 
implementation of projects addressing the towns’ needs.30  
 
The National Assembly’s most important contribution to the development of the governance in 
East Ghouta has been its initiative to set up the unified Council for East Ghouta by establishing a 
Supervisory Electoral Commission to oversee the elections for such a council.31  Building on the 
already existing local council in the city of Douma—a stronghold of the opposition in East 
Ghouta—a Local Council of the Damascus Province, (also known as the Local Council of the Civil 
Administration and Services, or Douma Council), was established in the city.32 Due to the many 
Council positions available, such as an agricultural specialist, legal experts, and technical assistants, 
                                                  
25
 Facebook page of the Committee for Women and Children in Erbin: https://www.facebook.com/C.W.C.ERBEEN. 
26
 Facebook page of the Saqba Local Council: https://www.facebook.com/LocalCouncil.Of.SaqbaCity.Ar. 
27
 Facebook page of the National Assembly of the Forces of the Revolution in East Ghouta: https://www.facebook.com/ 
N.R.O.F.REG1?fref=ts. 
28
 Razan Zaitouneh, ‘Will the National Coalition of Revolutionary Forces in East Ghouta be able to Unite the 
Revolutionary Forces?’, The Damascus Bureau, 19 August 2013, http://www.damascusbureau.org/?p=5762. 
29
 Press conference of the National Assembly of the Forces of the Revolution in East Ghouta, https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=Pr29PF9k0mQ#t=121. 
30
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the elections took place over a period of three days, with their fairness and transparency 
monitored by the Supervisory Commission. 
 
The Council is organised in a manner similar to the organisation of the other local city councils 
with medical, relief and other offices, but it also includes a larger number of members and 
technicians across a wider spectrum of professions. Due to the Council’s expanded functionality, 
its role has turned Douma into the administrative centre of the civilian opposition in East Ghouta.  
It has been praised by residents of Douma for its increased independence from foreign agendas, 
its wider representativeness and greater spectrum of offered services. In addition, its importance 
stems from its status as the first provincial council of the opposition in the Damascus Province and 
thus as the “first step in building a state”, according to its founders from the National Assembly of 
the Forces of the Revolution in East Ghouta.33  
 
In 2013, Douma became not only the location of the Local Council of Civil Administration and 
Services, (which assumed the role of provincial council), but also the centre of another initiative 
for the consolidation of governance in East Ghouta: the formation of Unified Medical, Unified 
Relief and Unified Service Offices. Those bodies were created to consolidate the efforts of the 
respective offices within the city councils and organise them on a provincial level, in order to 
enhance their cooperation and access to resources coming from donors. For example, the Unified 
Relief Office in East Ghouta was designed to unify the activities and objectives of the relief offices 
in the cities of East Ghouta.34 The establishment of a central Relief office for the region allowed for 
a direct communication with external donors and international relief organisations and a 
redistribution of the received resources according to an analysis of the different cities’ needs at 
certain times.35 The Unified Medical Office in East Ghouta is made up of 17 medical offices 
controlling 35 medical points in all of East Ghouta, to which it regularly redistributes medical 
equipment.36 It has also elaborated emergency plans and programs for the maximisation of 
medical resources and the standardisation of medical practice throughout all of East Ghouta, 
which have then been implemented by the local medical offices resulting in an enhanced use of 
the available resources.37 Lastly, a Unified Services Office was also established to organise on a 
provincial level the services offices within each city council. It has been particularly active in the 
implementation of various projects throughout all of East Ghouta, the analysis of the need of 
infrastructural rehabilitation in different cities and the provision of expertise. Those bodies have 
resulted in the consolidation of governance in East Ghouta and have addressed the problem of the 
multiplication of city councils by bringing them and their offices under a common umbrella and 
offering them additional support with their projects.  
 
5. Challenges to the governance mechanisms in East Ghouta  
 
While the proliferation of city councils and their consolidation in unified bodies acting on the 
provincial level has strengthened the resilience of the rebel-held territories, the problems 
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endangering this progress remain and even multiply with the further development of the 
administration in East Ghouta. Firstly, the practice of allocation of the resources deemed 
“necessary” for different cities by the Unified Offices or the Council of Local Administration and 
Services has already created significant conflicts both between the local councils and the central 
offices and between the city councils themselves. For example, the warehouse of the United Relief 
Office was attacked and disputes over some of the resources which had been withheld erupted, 
causing a rift between the provincial body and the residents of the area. Another problem has 
appeared as a result of the allocation of resources, executed according to the number of residents 
under the control of each town’s council. This practice means that some cities that have a smaller 
number of residents but suffer from greater difficulties in terms of infrastructure or the lack of 
food or medicine tend to receive less than the towns with more residents that are less affected by 
the siege and the bombardments. This disparity between needs and funding has exacerbated the 
tensions between certain city councils.  
 
Another issue that was complicated by the January 2014 elections and the establishment of the 
Local Council of the Civil Administration and Services in Douma has been the contestation of other 
similar bodies over the legitimacy and resources which this Council has claimed. Another group 
called the Local Council for the Damascus Suburb Governorate, claiming to represent the civilian 
opposition in East Ghouta and the Damascus Province as a whole, has not only rejected the 
legitimacy of the Local Council of the Civil Administration based in Douma, but also organised 
separate elections in February 2014 in order to challenge its establishment.38 The mutual 
boycotting of the elections of both bodies has divided the civilian opposition in East Ghouta and 
indicated a possible rift, resulting from a competition over legitimacy and resources.  
 
Lastly, while the current study focuses on the civilian elements of the opposition in East Ghouta, 
the presence of armed rebel forces cannot be ignored as the contestation between military and 
civilian components over the formation of local governance structures is constant and significant 
aspect of the political landscape in the Damascus Province. Military councils, such as the Douma 
Shura council headed by the military commander Zahran Alloush, leader of the Army of Islam, 
have tried to replace the civilian councils or impose its command on them in often violent ways.39 
As a result of one of those conflicts, some donors favourable to the civilian opposition have 
curtailed their support in order to avoid funding military formations40. Another instance of the 
clash between military and civilian bodies in East Ghouta was the kidnapping in December 2013 of 
the prominent activist Razan Zaitouneh - the founder of the biggest human rights organisation in 
the area, the Violations Documentation Centre.41 Zahran Alloush’s presumed involvement in the 
kidnapping has further deepened the civilian-military divide in East Ghouta. Nevertheless, the 
resolve of the East Ghouta residents to preserve the civilian institutions has been particularly 
strong in the face of military pressure. In addition to their rejection and condemnation of Alloush’s 
potential participation in the kidnapping of one of the most respected leaders of East Ghouta, the 
local residents reacted strongly to Alloush’s rejection of the Douma Council which he criticised for 
“dividing the voice of Muslims” and as being an “inexcusable transgression” for rivalling his army’s 
own institutional creation, the Shura Council.42 A large number of civilians in Douma issued a 
statement reiterating their duty to “reject any attempt by any party to force the people of Douma 
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under tyranny” and refusing to “obey any institution not elected by the people, no matter how 
wealthy and powerful it is”, demonstrating their unyielding dedication to the civilian nature of 
their local institutions.43  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The current discussion of the governance mechanisms in East Ghouta contributes to three debates 
centred on the prospects for the rebel-held territories around Damascus and throughout Syria, in 
light of the opposition’s demonstrated capacity to administer those spaces and the growing ability 
of the regime and other actors, such as the Islamic (IS), to deny it this authority.  The first debate 
concerns the presumed weakening of the rebel front around Damascus following the surrender of 
rebel-held towns in North and South Ghouta which signed a truce with the regime in December 
and January 2014 and the regime’s capture of key towns in East Ghouta in August and September 
2014.
44
 The advance of IS in East Ghouta, which became notable in June 2014, is also seen as a 
growing threat to the opposition’s capacity to maintain control over their stronghold in the 
Damascus suburbs.45 However, the opposition has so far repeatedly both the regime’s incursions 
from the west and ISIS advances from the east in this area.
46
 Therefore, East Ghouta rebels’ 
demonstrated resilience to those actors and to the threat of humanitarian collapse due to the 
imposed siege questions those claims and serves as an example of the crucial importance of 
flexible governance mechanisms in such settings.   
 
The second debate deals with the evolution of a rebel governance models throughout Syria and 
the intensifying competition between those. The current paper is a part of the developing body of 
literature focused on the governance of rebel-held territories around Damascus, which will strive 
to complement the existing extensive research on the civilian administration in the Aleppo47 and 
Idlib governorates.
48
 Many similarities can be found between the outlines of the governance 
structures in those three governorates and, even though significant differences exist, a tentative 
rebel governance model centred on the role of the city council and its constituent offices and 
dedicated to the original principles of the revolution and moderate Islamic values can be seen 
emerging. This model - contender for a potential post-war governance of Syria -  however, is also 
continually challenged by competing models of governance, offered by the Assad regime and the 
Islamic state in other parts of the country, which is makes understanding its ability to be resilient 
and viable, as demonstrated by the case of East Ghouta, important.   
 
Thirdly, highlighting the importance of the governance mechanisms in this area in particular 
contributes to current policy debates regarding the financial support to the opposition in Syria. 
Given the recent US pledge to arm moderate rebels in order to fight IS,49 financially assisting the 
civilian administration bodies in East Ghouta and other parts of country is no less significant for 
the struggle against the extremist forms of governance which IS has already implemented in 
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northern Syria and which it will undoubtedly try to create in the Damascus suburbs if it gains a 
firmer footing.  Furthermore, as this paper illustrates, the irreplaceable importance of the medical, 
relief and services offices throughout East Ghouta for the civilian population, it also demonstrates 
the mechanisms whereby international assistance to those governance bodies is likely to 
ameliorate the living conditions of around two million people and prevent multiple deaths 
resulting from the lack of medical resources, food, water and shelter. While questions regarding 
the likelihood of such funds reaching the civilian beneficiaries and not falling in the hands of 
armed groups persist and doubts about the ability of those bodies to overcome their structural 
deficiencies and tendency for in-fighting recur, the ability of those governance institutions to learn 
and adapt in order to face those and other challenges, as this paper has demonstrated, has so far 
proved to be superior to the obstacles to their survival. 
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